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1 Introduction   
The northeast region of India has historically seen high levels of violence, stemming 
mostly from ethnic and separatist conflicts.1 In 2003, there were 1,107 militancy-related 
deaths in the region, 882 in 2004, and 715 in 2005. In the first two months of 2006 
alone, as many as 112 people died in violent incidents (Government of India 2005b: 
165; Institute for Conflict Management 2006).2 An official report describes the law and 
order situation in the region as being ‘vitiated’, an outcome it claims of the activities of 
the region’s insurgent and extremist groups (ibid.: 34). A crucial aspect of the violence 
in the region has been frequent ethnic clashes resulting in heavy loss of life and 
property.3 These have also led to large displacements. According to one estimate, there 
are between 150,000 to 200,000 internally displaced persons in the region.4 Ethnic 
violence exists alongside interethnic contestations over resources and opportunities in 
which the state finds itself pulled in different directions with little ability to provide 
solutions.5 As a result, politics has often moved to the streets and protests, ‘public 
curfews’ and blockades by students and ethnic associations, many with the active 
support of armed groups, have become commonplace (Sandham: 2004). 
 
Table 1: Insurgency violence in northeast India 
 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
Assam Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Tripura  Total 
Population (m)   1.1  26.6  2.2 2.3 0.9 2.0  3.2  38.3 
Occurrence of violence 
2002 32  559  239  66  -  90  386  1372 
2003 39  401  205  79  1  86  296  1107 
2004 43  315  212  47  4  97  164  882 
2005  -  242  331 29  -  40 73  715 




                                                 
1 The region is made up of seven provinces—Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura—with a total population of 38 million.  
2 These figures include rebels, government forces and civilians killed in separatist and ethnic clashes.   
3 Naga-Kuki, Kuki-Paite and Naga-Metei clashes in Manipur; Hmar-Dimasa violence in Assam; tribal 
and non-tribal violence in Tripura and inter-tribal conflicts in Nagaland, being the prominent ones.  
4 The US Committee of Refugees in its World Refugee Survey 2003 quoted in The Times of India, 
Guwahati, 2 July 2004. Also see Hussain (2005). 
5 The northeast has a significantly higher level of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization compared to the 
rest of India. While it makes up only 4 per cent of the country’s population, the region accounts for 58 of 
the 114 recognized languages and 100 of the 600 tribes in India (Registrar General of India 2001).    2
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There has been much engagement in both the policy and the academic communities in 
India with the crisis in northeast India. But as is evident, peace has eluded much of the 
region at serious costs to the region’s societies and to its citizens. Prolonged violence in 
the region has also impacted on the character of the state and on its democratic 
credentials. The urgency to restore peace is therefore strong. This paper is concerned 
with peace building in northeast India, and with the practical issues of negotiating 
challenges to reconstruction from conflicts there. The paper is organized as follows: I 
begin by examining the response of the central state to violence in northeast India to 
show how these remain inadequate. I follow this with brief survey of some ongoing 
research on conflicts in the region to understand what could be learnt from them. I then 
set out to propose some interventions for the region’s reconstruction. Visualizing 
reconstruction as the process of strengthening the legitimate authority of the state helps 
me structure those interventions around the state’s principal functions—enabling 
security and rule of law and providing basic services and economic opportunities for all 
citizens, cleanly and transparently. I conclude by emphasising the importance of social 
cohesiveness in the reconstruction process and how inclusive political organizations and 
policies can help to construct it. 
   3
2 The  state’s  response 
The central government has adopted, broadly three approaches to dealing with violence 
in northeast India: (i) use of force against rebel groups, (ii) accommodation of ethnic 
aspirations of cultural communities, and (iii) enhanced transfers to the region for its 
socioeconomic development. The first has been the state’s ‘counter insurgency’ 
approach. Outbreak of violence in Nagaland soon after independence (led by the Naga 
National Council) and in Mizoram in 1966 by the Mizo National Front (MNF), and by 
groups in other parts of the northeast in successive years, all led to strong military 
responses declaring rebel groups as unlawful, deploying central forces, including the 
army and creating an institutional environment to facilitate military operations.6 While 
these special measures were initially introduced in specific pockets in the region, today 
the army and central forces are deployed in much of the entire northeast, as is the 
application of special counter-insurgency laws. Yet, central agencies admit, ‘despite 
heavy deployment of (central paramilitary) forces, it has not been possible to meet the 
demands of the states for additional forces’, to contain the activities of the region’s 
numerous armed groups. (Government of India 2005b: 33-5).7  
 
National leaders have also shown a willingness to meet ‘legitimate grievances of the 
people’ of the region. (Government of India 2005b: 34) Along with the use of force, 
they have tried to accommodate separatist demands by redrawing political boundaries 
and by creating new administrative units in the region. India’s constitution introduced 
the institution of Autonomous District Councils (ADC) to give the region’s tribal groups 
a semblance of self-rule by providing them greater control over local resources and 
protection of cultural identity. Where a particular group was not satisfied with this 
‘limited’ accommodation, as was the case with the Nagas, central leaders went ahead 
and created separate provinces for them, providing local elites with more effective 
control over resources and power. Mounting demands for protection of identities and 
increase in separatist insurgencies led, in 1972 and in a smaller measure in 1987, to the 
central government’s undertaking a wholesale reorganization of northeast India and 
creating (in some cases upgrading) existing units to provinces with substantial political 
and economic powers. Over the years, demands for creation of new administrative units 
and divisions of others have multiplied, providing a commentary on the efficacy of the 
policy of accommodation-by-separation.  
 
The 1972 reorganization of northeast India coincided with a growing feeling in policy 
circles that the region’s crisis could well be on account of economic factors, particularly 
due to its economic backwardness.8 This led to a policy frame favouring the central 
                                                 
6 These include the Armed Forces Special Powers (AFSPA) Act 1958, legislated to deal with insurgency 
in the northeast. 
7 According to the report, there are at least 13 major armed groups active in northeast India.  
8 Admittedly, driving the newfound interest in the development of the northeast was security concerns, 
especially India’s anxiety about China’s presence on the regions borders.    4
government’s active role in developing the northeast and improving its infrastructure to 
catalyze growth. The same year, the North Eastern Council—a regional development 
institution with no parallel in the rest of India—was set up, with its base in Shillong, to 
plan and monitor development. Creation of new provinces had also meant the 
establishment of large administrative structures in each of them. As most provinces did 
not have adequate financial base, much of the expenditure for this large public sector 
was subsidized by the central government. This trend has continued with creation of 
new developmental structures and increase in developmental investment in the region.9  
 
But it is evident that the central government’s package of interventions has only 
managed to keep the lid on the situation. Political order and security in northeast India, 
both for the state and its citizens, remain elusive. Each of its interventions, perfectly 
sensible as they may appear, has had associated costs. Excessive reliance on force by 
vesting central forces with special powers to counter the insurgent threat, has led to 
frequent allegations of human rights violations by state agencies responsible for 
upholding the rule of law. This has in turn diminished the legitimacy of the state in the 
eyes of people—an emotion that has been exploited by rebels to their advantage. Rebel 
groups have also managed to occupy, with some success, the void left by the national 
and subnational state’s poor ability to provide security to citizens, especially with regard 
to ethnic violence (Baruah 2002). On the other hand, the large infusion of resources, not 
only for capital investment but also for maintenance of the region’s bloated public 
sector has contributed to limiting the ability of subnational states in the northeast to 
improve management of their economies. Alongside, hefty transfers to the region have, 
in the absence of effective accountability mechanisms, encouraged extensive rent-
seeking by those able to access those resources, which has led a criminal economy with 
militias colluding with public officials to siphon off public funds (Sahni 2001; also 
Verghese 1996). It has also been argued that central leaders have often been tolerant of 
rent-seeking activity by the region’s political class precisely to be able to buy their 
support for counter insurgency practices (Baruah 2002: 3). In any case, while it is 
unclear if the large infusion of resources from the rest of the country to northeast India 
has led to any measure of equitable growth, there is a case for seeing the transfers-
driven developmental thrust, at least in its present form, as having complicated matters 
further. 
 
And responding to identity-based demands by creating community-specific territorial 
units may have helped crystallize and further harden ethnic divisions in society. The 
policy has also promoted a spurt in competitive ethnic mobilization by elites of different 
communities, precisely to have separate dispensations, a dynamic that contributes to 
cycles of conflict. (Baruah 2005: 11). Despite the abundance of evidence pointing to the 
                                                 
9 The Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (MDoNER) set in 2001. Among its chief tasks 
is to ensure that central departments spend at least 10 per cent of their annual budget on projects in the 
region. Government of India (2005a: 13). In 1997 the centre also announced the US$2.2 billion package 
for development of physical and social infrastructure of the region.     5
role of community-specific political institutions in fragmenting societies and weakening 
the authority of the democratic state, prescriptions for accommodation of identity-based 
demands have continued to propose further strengthening of traditional institutions and 
for bringing them centre stage in the region’s governance (Government of India 2001a).  
3  Conflicts of authority 
Part of the problem could be with the understanding of the phenomenon. Conflicts in 
the region have been seen as responses of local communities to their unequal and forced 
integration into the Indian ‘mainstream’ or deriving from the instability caused by rapid 
modernization of the region, even from the unequal power structures and inter-
community competition over resources (Sanajaoba 1988; Singh 1987; Shimray 2004). 
Some accounts attribute the disorder to weakening political institutions and to 
leadership choices of the central state and to its use of authoritarian policies and 
structures (Kohli 1998; Baruah 2005). While each of these explanations is valid and has 
contributed in its own way to the problem, they all miss the point about variance of 
violence within northeast India, something that determines the crucial characteristic of 
the crisis. As is evident from a reading of Table 1, different provinces have shown 
different susceptibility to violence and breakdown. Violence in Tripura, Assam and 
Nagaland shows a decline in recent years. Manipur’s has been a case of sustained and 
spiralling cycles of the phenomenon, over time. And as Mizoram demonstrates, 
restoring peace in the region is definitely possible. Mizoram went through two decades 
of intense violence on account of clashes between government forces and the rebel 
Mizo National Front (MNF). An agreement, negotiated in 1986, brought an end to 
separatist violence and has provided the basis for stability in that province.  
 
How has it been possible to restore peace in Mizoram, while in places like Manipur, 
violence has got worse? And why is peace-building proving so difficult in Nagaland, 
admittedly not surprising, considering its history of broken peace agreements? In the 
literature, the Mizoram exception has been attributed to the role, either of the central 
government—the ‘economic largesse’ for socioeconomic development of the province 
and the readiness and capability of national leaders to integrate and accommodate the 
MNF (Jafa 2000; Baruah 2005: 71) or to that of forces closer home—a cohesive Mizo 
society, undisputed leadership within MNF ranks and the ability of religious/social 
organizations to demand peace (Baruah 2005: 71).  
 
Surely, showering economic largesse has been a staple response of the central 
government to the challenge in the northeast and has not been confined to Mizoram. As 
has been argued, this has led in many cases to outcomes at variance with their intended 
objectives. Integrative capabilities of the Congress party have also not proved very 
helpful for peace in provinces like Manipur or Nagaland that have a long ‘congress 
tradition’. However if central to restoring peace in Mizoram were issues of united rebel 
ranks, proactive role of church-based organizations and a cohesive society; questions   6
that we need to focus on, and which have direct implications for reconstruction, are: 
what explains the cohesiveness of Mizo society; what accounts for the synergy of 
political leaders and social organizations there to work for peace and indeed for a 
semblance of good governance; why is society in places like Manipur so fragmented; 
why do state leaders there find themselves so unable to connect with society? Why do 
they find themselves so helpless in the face of pressure from conflicting social groups? 
And why have Manipur’s social organizations not had the same leverage for peace as 
similar organizations in Mizoram?10  
 
Ongoing comparative historical research on conflicts in the region may provide some 
tentative answers to these questions. According to one such account, it is the process of 
state-making that has played the key role, along with the character of the society, in 
determining the authority of the state and its capability, at least in Manipur and 
Mizoram (for some very preliminary results and discussions, see Hassan 2006). The 
argument is that it was colonial and post-colonial policies and strategies used by 
political leaders that led, on the one hand, to consolidation of the state’s authority and 
its impact on enabling a cohesive society in Mizoram; and on the other, to contested and 
weak authority of state agencies and fragmentation of society in Manipur. It has been 
demonstrated that in Mizoram, while colonial policies helped consolidate the authority 
of the state, state-making leaders reinforced their hold over state power by building an 
inclusive Mizo identity and by broad-basing their support. This has resulted in 
formation of a Mizo state that is embedded in society while its leaders have managed to 
remain largely autonomous from social groups that could constrain the authority of the 
state—all ending up in upholding the capability and legitimacy of the state. On the other 
hand, political actors in Manipur have historically strengthened the hold of traditional 
and non-state actors, creating both a weak and contested authority structure and the 
salience of multiple identities. This has led on the one hand to fragmentation of society 
and on the other to poor downward reach of the state. State leaders often find 
themselves powerless and with little legitimacy in society. This has had negative 
implications for the capability of state leaders to manage conflicts and provide good 
governance. These findings echo observations that see powerful traditional political 
institutions in the region, engendering ‘conflicts of authority’ that are the basis of tribal 
identity and separateness, hence likely to augment the forces of conflict (Harriss 2003: 
2; Baruah 2004; Sharma 2004). 
 
Therefore if a key driver of instability in northeast India are conflicts of authority and its 
adverse impact on the state and on society, policy prescriptions for the region that result 
in weakening the authority of the state—in part by strengthening exclusive and 
traditional institutions—and by facilitating transfers to the region that are more likely to 
                                                 
10 The same could be said about other provinces, though the Manipur example is more extreme, and 
hence analytically more ‘useful’. However, some may find these society-centred dynamics in Nagaland, 
better suited to comparison with Mizoram’s, on account of the all-tribal character of the former and 
ongoing efforts there to forge an overarching Naga identity.    7
be captured by traditional elites, may well be adding to the problem rather than helping 
to solve it. If this interpretation of the phenomenon in the region is accurate, then the 
task of peace-building must be: to enhance the authority of the state, weaken incentives 
that promote institutions competing with the state’s authority, establish state-wide rules 
in place of community specific ones, and work to promote greater cohesiveness in 
society.11  
 
Enhancing the authority of the state is essentially about enhancing its strength and 
capability, i.e. ability of the state to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws 
cleanly and transparently (Fukuyama 2004: 5). This implies that while it is important to 
develop instrumentalities of the state—specifically bureaucracy, courts and a monopoly 
over coercive power—and devise incentive structures that would make the action of the 
state and its leaders effective, the exercise will be a non-starter if enhancing state 
authority is not accompanied by adherence of the instruments of state to democratic 
political institutions, i.e. formal and informal constraints such as accountability, 
transparency and the restraint of corruption embodied in the concept of ‘rule of law’ 
(North 1991: 97). In other words, unless the state is seen to be legitimate in the eyes of 
those it governs, its strength, and therefore its authority, will remain contested. It is 
evident that by pursuing militaristic practices that come at a cost to the rule of law, and 
economic policies that have little mechanism for accountability, the state in northeast 
India may have greatly compromised its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Therefore the 
reconstruction challenge can be rephrased to read: building the legitimate authority of 
the state and promoting cohesiveness in society. 
 
According to this reading, a cohesive society is essential to enhancing the legitimate 
authority of the state as it enables the state to plug into society’s strength and helps the 
society to identity with the state. But a cohesive society is crucial to a strong (meaning 
legitimate) state in another way. It is only societies that are cohesive which seem to 
have generated demand for good institutions that then result in reforms. Where society 
is not organized in cohesive groups, citizens, rather than demanding accountability from 
the government, organize into sections and interest groups to seek greater government 
subsidy and benefits (Fukuyama 2004: 47). It has been argued that this lack of domestic 
demand for good institutions is the chief barrier to development in developing societies. 
In the absence of domestic demand, most effort at building institutions comes from 
external agencies. The result of these externally driven reform efforts has been mixed. 
 
The importance of domestic demand for good institutions rings true for northeast India 
as it does for other successful cases of state-building. A cohesive society in Mizoram 
                                                 
11 Clearly the ‘conflicts of authority’ argument applies best to tribal areas of the region. But state power 
in non-tribal areas, such as in Manipur, is equally a subject of contest. Commentators have pointed to the 
persistence of class conflicts in the region and to the monopolization of state power by the dominant 
class. See Singh (1998: 247-50) for an account of Manipur. Perhaps it is the precarious base of state 
power that preserves conditions of crisis in that society.    8
enabled its social and political organizations to demand peace, work for and obtain it. 
Other societies, (the case of Nagaland is instructive), divided as they are, have been 
unable to rise above mutual contestations to demand a change, often falling prey to 
divisive attempts by vested interest. Faced with widespread disorder and poor capacity 
of subnational states in the region, the central state has responded by trying to contain 
the violence, accommodate ethnic aspirations, and spur growth. Poor success of much 
of this agenda has led the central government, steadily assuming to itself, the functions 
of subnational state agencies, further weakening domestic state capacity. And as has 
been the case in Manipur, often actions of national leaders have themselves contributed 
to fissures in domestic societies in the region, further compromising the capability of 
subnational states and deepening the crisis (Phanjoubam 2004). This reading of the 
trajectory of weakening state capability and deepening crises highlights the crucial role 
of building cohesive societies to enable good institutions. If a central problem of the 
region is that societies are not organized in cohesive groups that can demand and work 
for peace and for accountable and efficient public institutions, then at least as much 
effort should go into building cohesion in society, as into enhancing the state’s 
legitimate authority and into invigorating local economy to create growth.  
4  An agenda for reconstruction: peace and recovery 
A useful manner of engaging with reconstructing from war and collapse is provided by 
the ‘crisis states’ framework that sees developing societies as states-in-the-making, 
where formal rule systems (of the state) exist alongside and in conflict with rule systems 
of non-state actors. According to this reading, conflicts between rule systems occur 
broadly around three dimensions of the state: (i) the security system (ii) the legal system 
(iii) the administrative system. It is how the state is able to perform along the three 
dimensions of ‘stateness’ vis-à-vis the performance of non-state actors that would 
determine its strength and capability (Putzel 2005: 4). Seen this way, reconstruction 
(used here to mean enhancing the strength of the state) would firstly entail penetration 
by the state, politically and economically, throughout society. This is possible only 
when the state is able to substitute informal authority and rule systems with the formal 
state-wide system and also become the credible source of security for all—the powerful 
as well as the masses. Also required will be increasingly capturing most economic 
activity within the formal sphere and allocating property rights; and building institutions 
that help mitigate extreme inequalities and those that provide equal access to basic 
services and create economic opportunities. It has been argued that, ultimately, the 
success of reconstruction will depend on crafting a cohesive society by building 
inclusive state-wide organizations and pursuing inclusive policies. It is this framework 
of the institutional analysis of the state along its basic functions that I will use to engage 
with possible reconstruction efforts in northeast India.    9
4.1  Providing security  
A prerequisite for reconstruction is for agencies of the state to be able to dominate the 
security system. This system provides for, among others, the enforcement of laws and 
judicial and administrative decisions and for protection from violence and threats. 
Domination of the security system entails strengthening capabilities of state agencies to 
provide these functions effectively and in consonance with the rule of law. Ability of 
the state in the northeast to enforce laws and to provide security is evidently limited. 
These are on account of the poor capacity of coercive agencies of the state as well as on 
account of the competition that state agencies face from non-state actors in the security 
arena. Late colonization and consequently delayed state-building efforts combine with a 
difficult terrain to constrain abilities of state forces. In much of the region, and 
definitively in the tribal tracts, the presence of the formal coercive authority of the 
state—the police and investigative agencies—is only symbolic. This may in part be due 
to the colonial legacy of reliance on chiefs and tribal strongmen to police and provide 
security in their tracts; policies that have generally been allowed to continue. Rather 
than building capacities of agencies of provincial forces, the move has been to deploy 
central forces, armed with special powers and little appreciation of local realities, to 
counter challenges by rebel groups. While central forces may have helped shore up the 
coercive power of the state, they have often also been accused of compromising the rule 
of law by violating human rights of civilians. (Luithui et al. 1984; Baruah 2005; Parrat 
2005). Reliance on central forces has also shifted focus away from the need to build 
effective local capacities. Poor training, leadership, control, command structure and 
weak accountability mechanisms have contributed to reduced legitimacy of provincial 
forces among citizens (Laishram 2004, for a summary of these dynamics in Manipur). 
 
Rebels pose an equally big challenge to the coercive authority of state agencies. The 
myriad armed groups active in the region enjoy significant coercive power in society, 
and perform a variety of roles: from protecting their communities against attacks by 
other militants groups, to imposing taxes and to regulating social behaviour in the 
community. On the other hand, agencies of coercive power of the state appear incapable 
of enforcing their monopoly to provide these functions to society. Despite the continued 
deployment of significant force levels in the region, the state’s success in monopolizing 
authority, by eliminating rebel groups, has been poor. A variety of factors could be 
contributing to this—hilly terrain which makes military operations difficult; rents and 
benefits that rebels as well as state and other non-state actors are able to generate in the 
climate of violence—and have led to a vested interest in continuance of violence, as 
well as the considerable sympathy that rebel groups seem to command among local 
populace due, in part, to the commissions and omissions of state agencies themselves 
(Baruah 2002). 
   10
At the same time, national leaders have not been very successful in negotiating peace 
with rebel groups and in bringing armed movements to a close.12 Currently the central 
government has ceasefire agreements with a number of militant groups in northeast 
India. But as demonstrated by the Naga case, the path to peace has been rough. National 
leaders have invested much in the peace talks with the National Socialists Council of 
Nagalim, Isaac-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM), arguably the strongest rebel organization 
in the region. But despite many rounds of peace negotiations, including at the highest 
political level, signs of a settlement are not hopeful. The dispute is undoubtedly 
complicated, requiring a likewise solution. But many observers blame national leaders 
for having made a difficult situation worse by conducting peace talks unimaginatively—
being secretive and narrow in approach and inspiring little trust among the different 
parties to the peace process (Phanjoubam 2004).  
 
An equally big failure of the state, something that impacts on security for citizens, has 
been its inability to demilitarize societies where ceasefire deals have been in effect. The 
Naga peace talks provide a good example again. The central government’s ceasefire 
agreement with NSCN (IM) has only very weak provisions concerning withdrawal of 
armed forces, by both the state and rebels and of the restoration of rule of law in areas 
where the agreement is in effect. State agencies have shown little urgency to enforce 
even those weak provisions. As a result, while violence between Naga rebels and state 
forces has reduced notably, violence in society itself amongst rival Naga factions and 
against civilians by militias has continued (Table 2). It is clear that though state forces 
have managed to contain their own losses, society at large continues to be troubled by 
violence. Alongside, legitimate authority of the state in areas affected by the ceasefire, 
has been compromised while rebels have increased their hold in society leading, among 
other things, to increased criminality (Shashinungla 2005). 
Table 2: Insurgency related killings in Nagaland  
Year    1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
S t a t e  f o r c e s    4 8   3 8   1 4   442231   0
Rebels   112  218  72  118 84 76 29 31 22  31
Civilians    144  104 26 26 13 25 5 3 35  9
Source: Institute for Conflict Management (2006).  
 
But often legitimate authority of the state has been compromised by state agencies 
themselves, who are frequently accused of violating rights of citizens and of 
undermining the rule of law (Routray 2003). Both formal institutional arrangements and 
informal values and codes of practice within which security agencies operate may 
account for this. The Armed Forces Special Powers (AFSP) Act 1958 has been 
criticized by civil society and human rights groups for being tolerant of human rights 
                                                 
12 The notable exception being MNF. As demonstrated, this was at least as much a product of the Mizo 
domestic demand for peace as of the ability of central leaders to negotiate it.   11
violations and of obstructing redress of genuine grievances (Laishram 2004; Rana 
2005).13 Further, informal codes and values at work on the ground enable principles of 
democratic practice such as strict civilian control of armed forces, adherence to rule of 
law and disciplined conduct of security personnel, to be violated (Parratt 2005: 145-60). 
In the absence of an effective and independent oversight mechanism over security 
operations, violations of rule of law often go unpunished. Though many provinces in the 
region have their own human rights commissions which supplement the work of the 
National Human Rights Commission, their role is limited to advising and 
recommending corrective action and falls very much short of being able to enforce 
them.  
 
Restoring the state’s monopoly over legitimate coercive power, a sin qua non for 
reconstruction, will therefore require extensive institutional reforms in the security 
sector—both in formal laws and regulations as well as in informal codes of conduct to 
uphold democratic values. Much of the ongoing effort of the centre to enhance capacity 
of provincial agencies to tackle insurgency has been limited to ‘modernizing’ police 
forces of the region, which has inevitably meant a focus on better and more 
sophisticated equipment with some efforts at better training of officers (Government of 
India 2005b: 181). Perhaps a more complete reform of the security sector could include:  
(i)  reforming formal laws such as special regulations that conflict with norms of 
justice and that may facilitate human rights violations, to bring them in line with 
rule of law; and putting in place effective independent mechanism for oversight 
that could hold forces—local police as well as central paramilitary agencies and 
army formations—accountable for their actions;  
(ii)  developing more robust informal constraints and codes of conduct through better 
leadership and appropriate command and control mechanism to make security 
agencies disciplined and effective in fighting insurgency without having to resort 
to violation of rules; and  
(iii)  enhanced capacity-building through better equipping of forces and better 
training for officers, but also training for the rank and file to improve their 
effectiveness to respond to the security challenge. Is the state able to provide 
security to all, the powerful and the marginalized, the majority and the minority? 
That is essential test of the legitimacy of the state’s coercive power. Unless the 
state in northeast India is able to provide this assurance to all sections of society, 
its claim to monopoly will remain a matter of contest.  
 
                                                 
13 Widespread public agitation in Manipur led the central government to set up a committee to review the 
working of AFSPA and recommend suitable changes. Government of India (2005b: 34)   12
4.2  Establishing the rule system 
It is equally important for the state to be able to provide its citizens with a single rule 
system (formal institutions) to govern their lives. The rule system provides mechanism 
for dispute resolution and codifies property rights as well as regulations that govern 
social, economic and political activities. In the northeast, and particularly amongst its 
tribal communities, much of the formal laws of the state encompassing key institutions 
such as property rights, as well as the organizational means to enforce those, are 
excluded. Thus the Constitution (Article 371A) excludes national laws in respect of 
religious and social practices of Nagas and, more important, their customary law and 
procedures, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to 
Naga customary law as well as in respect of ownership and transfer of land in the state. 
Similar provisions exist for Mizoram (Article 371G) and for other tribal areas in the 
region. With national laws excluded, it is customary codes and procedures (specific for 
each community) that determine social interaction. Multiplicity of ethnic groups and 
hence codes and practices has led to a multitude of community specific codes operating 
in the region, most in conflict with each other. The state has sought to penetrate these 
areas by enhancing its administrative presence, particularly via its ‘developmental’ 
thrust. The package of programmes aimed at ‘developing’ individuals and communities 
in the region has produced its own set of formal and informal rules and practices.  
 
A case in point is the hilly area of Manipur, where multiple formal and informal 
institutions and structures exist, engendering friction and crises. The formal land system 
in Manipur (Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act 1960) is excluded from its 
Hills that make up some 70 per cent of the total land area of the province. Consequently 
property rights in those areas are community-specific, in some cases even specific to the 
particular village; and there is little consolidation or codification of practices. Thus 
much of the interpretation in dispute resolution depends on personal judgment (and 
often interest) of those who decide. Land is often owned collectively by the village, 
there is no system of formally recording land titles, and little private ownership. 
Community ownership of land means that the system allows for a degree of equal 
access to livelihoods, and may be behind the absence of acute poverty in these areas as 
in other tribal parts of the northeast. But in the absence of formal and recorded rights to 
individuals, the system has also favoured the hold of local elites who enjoy authority. 
Absence of private ownership has also proved a barrier to investment in productive 
enterprise (Government of India 1981: 40). Absence of formal property rights also 
means that these societies are vulnerable to attempts by vested interests that can use 
ethnic mobilization and violence to forcibly evict landholders, a dynamic that has often 
fed the frequent ethnic clashes in the region.14  
 
                                                 
14 The Naga Kuki clashes (1992-96) and Kuki Paite clashes (1997-98) in Manipur, for example, led to 
large eviction of people from their lands.    13
Administrative and judicial authority in these parts exists in village councils that are 
headed by unelected tribal chiefs and who rely on traditional authority and customary 
codes for their control.15 These are specific to the community, may not be democratic 
and tend to exclude non-locals and women. Traditionally, chiefs and local councils have 
the authority to tax and police their village and now increasingly to implement and 
monitor publicly funded development programmes. In an arena where the state’s 
authority is tenuous, new social organizations, with little democratic credentials, have 
begun to play an increasingly large role and capture authority. For instance, in 1988 the 
Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL) compiled the shiyan tanza, or code of customary law, for 
the Tangkhul community and set up its court as a forum where intra- and inter-village 
disputes could be resolved based on customary laws and practices that it had devised. 
Today, most cases of disputes in villages in Ukhrul district are referred from the village 
councils to the TNL court. (Shimray 1985: 185-6). Similarly the Zeliangrong Union 
(ZU) has taken the Zeliangrong community’s common customary code for its judicial 
activities. It has set up its own court to which disputes are referred by the village pei 
(council) for adjudication. Community specific ‘tribal’ organizations have therefore 
acquired de facto authority in society. They also use this authority to capture the 
substantial resources that the state spends on development in these areas. Their chosen 
manner of mobilizing support is identity-based and which has fed into conflicts. Similar 
multiplicity and frictions and consequent conflicts of authority and contestations exist in 
other provinces (see Baruah 2004; Sharma 2004). While provisions ensuring salience of 
traditional institutions may have been necessary at the time of writing of the 
Constitution, ‘to accommodate tribal aspirations and identities within the democratic 
framework through tribal self rule’, their continued presence and further strengthening, 
poses obvious problems (Government of India 2001a).  
 
But the task of institutional reforms in the region still faces the challenge of 
accommodating community/tribal sensitivities, which may not be served by a wholesale 
switch to formal nationwide laws. A probable solution to this dilemma may be provided 
by the Mizoram example. In that province, a chain of events in colonial and post 
colonial times, led to consolidation of customary laws and practices of different 
communities into a unified code of legal practice (Mizo Hnam Dam) and its being 
brought within the formal legal system of the state. Alongside, reforms in property 
rights in the province in 1956 led to abolition of the institution of chiefship (with its 
iniquitous land laws) and to its substitution by elected village councils and to formal and 
equitable rights over land. (Das 1987, 1990). Legal reforms have helped the state 
consolidate its authority and legitimacy in the province, and have contributed to 
bringing its communities closer. And formal property rights in land have enabled more 
equitable access to resources (Das 1990: 219) and as is increasingly being realized now, 
to the state being better positioned to attract investment. To repeat, it is not that 
community practices and codes in Mizoram were supplanted by formal ones; but only 
                                                 
15 Manipur Village Authority in Hill Areas Act 1956.   14
that they have been co-opted and brought within the framework of the formal system, 
preventing those community specific institutions from acting as autonomous bases of 
authority, contestations and mobilization. This has helped to balance Mizo identity and 
attachment to culture with reforms that have allowed establishing formal and equitable 
property rights. This may have contributed to stability in the province.  
 
A key step towards reconstruction then must be to consolidate rule systems. This must 
include codifying customary rules, bringing them within the formal legal framework 
while ensuring that property rights accommodate aspirations of all sections and provide 
equal access to resources for all. Consolidate of rule systems must not be misread as 
centralizing the state’s power and supplanting community life by one that is state-
sanctioned. The issue at hand is whether rules systems that communities live by are 
consistent with democratic norms and if they conflict with state-wide norms. Customary 
codes and traditional practices can hardly consistent with democratic norms. They also 
embody in them conditions of crisis. Consolidation of formal rule system does not mean 
diluting special protection for disadvantaged communities, provisions that in fact make 
the state more legitimate in the eyes of those sections. Rather, it means addressing 
institutional arrangements that could possibly facilitate exclusive practices and crises. 
 
Given the sensitivities surrounding tribal identity in the region—which is so tied up 
with traditional institutions and practices—this task may have to be phased, beginning 
with instilling liberal, democratic and equity norms in exiting community codes and 
practices and then eventually bring them all within the formal framework. Ultimately, it 
is the state that must guarantee this change by being committed to acting as the sole 
provider of rule systems or at least to being the system that provides the framework 
within which multiple systems can function, to ensure they do not contradict norms of 
natural justice. As has often been the case, the state has itself left the terrain open for 
non-state agents to provide alternative rule systems. In Manipur for instance, structures 
for enforcing the formal legal system—the police, magistracy and law courts—have, 
over the years, denuded their presence in hill areas, due sometimes to security reasons, 
but often due to the poor commitment of the state to providing all sections of society 
with equal access to governance. The void left by this move has been filled by a variety 
of non-state actors—traditional tribal organizations, informal social associations and 
increasingly by armed groups, eager to establish their authority.16 And in Mizoram the 
gains made by consolidation of customary rules may be beginning to be unraveled by 
penetration of local structures of the state by exclusionary social organizations (Baruah 
and Sharma 2004).  
4.3  Enabling public services and opportunities    
Reconstruction will be incomplete without provision of public services and economic 
opportunities to citizens. Challenges here are around delivery of public services 
                                                 
16 The Sangai Express, ‘NPMHR rejects verdict of Ato Longphang’, 21 September 2005.   15
adequately, and effective management of economy. They are also about the institutional 
and organizational arrangements necessary to ensure capital formation, private 
investment and growth. Important here, as in other dimensions of the state, is its ability 
to provide these public goods equitably for all. How has the state performed on these 
counts in the region? What can be done to improve access of communities to public 
services and to enable better and more broad-based growth? 
 
Performance in the social sector, and the consequent wellbeing of citizens in the region, 
appears to be a mixed bag (Table 3). The northeast as a whole has performed much 
better than the rest of India in terms of literacy, a fact that has been credited less to the 
working of the state than to the historical role of Christian missionaries and to the 
continued support of local communities. A case in point is Mizoram, with a history of 
sustained missionary contribution in primary education, which ranks second only to 
Kerala, in terms of literacy attainments in India. Yet there are pockets in the region with 
a much less impressive showing on literacy. Health indicators such as infant mortality 
rate (IMR) and attitudes towards gender (sex ratio being a good proxy), though on the 
whole better in the region than the rest of India, demonstrate a similar variation. 
Manipur and Mizoram perform much better on these counts than do Arunachal Pradesh 
and Meghalaya. In terms of incomes and extent of poverty however, the region appears 
to have, according to the data available, performed worse than the rest of the country. 
Except in Mizoram, the poor in northeast India account for a larger share of the 
population than they do in India as a whole. Together these counts create a situation 
where the region—generally rich in resources and where access to land and other assets 
is considered equitable—has performed only moderately in terms of overall citizen 
wellbeing. 
 



















A. Pradesh  54.34  37  901  33.47  -  29 
Assam 63.25  70  932  36.09  10,951  26 
Manipur   70.53  14  978  28.54  13,213  9 
Meghalaya   62.56  61  975  33.87  14,510  24 
Mizoram   88.80  14  938  19.47  -  7 
Nagaland   66.59  42  909  32.67  11,119  11 
Tripura   73.19  34  950  34.44  -  22 
All India   64.84  63  933  26.10  17,978  - 
Source: Government of India (2001b; 2005a); Government of Nagaland (2004). 
Note: *US$1 = IR45 
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Though finding a direct link between status of wellbeing and violence across provinces 
in northeast India is difficult, a probable relationship could be found between variations 
within provinces and levels of violence in them. Though intra-province data is hard to 
come by, preliminary findings conform this. The case of Manipur is demonstrative. 
Much of the success of the province in the social sector appears to have taken place in 
its central valley region, home to its majority community and where its administrative 
headquarters are located, while hill districts inhabited by tribal communities continue to 
lag behind (Table 4). Similar spatial disparities can be noticed in Nagaland, where the 
peripheral Mon and Tuensang districts fall much below the rest of the province in 
literacy rate (42.25 per cent and 51.30 per cent respectively, compared to 67.11 per cent 
overall), sex ratio (Mon with 881 compared to 909 overall) and access to health services 
(Government of Nagaland 2004); as well as in Mizoram where literacy levels among the 
Chakma and other Kuki categories were 14.7 per cent and 27.16 per cent compared to 
67.76 per cent for Mizos (Registrar General of India 1981).  
Table 4: Inter-district disparity in Manipur  
  HDI   HDI rank   % of poor  
Hill districts       
Chandel   0.5154  6  42.0 
Churachandpur   0.5676  4  40.0 
Senapati   0.4602  8  51.3 
Tamenglong   0.5120  7  54.5 
Ukhrul   0.5800  3  44.4 
Valley districts       
Bishnupur 0.6390  2  26.24 
Imphal   0.6455  1  19.33 
Thoubal   0.5559  5  24.39 
Sources: Government of Manipur (2003). 
Table 5: Macroeconomic indicators   
  Growth rate  
(% SDP)  
(1997-2002) 
PK NSDP  
(IRs)  




% own rev. to 
total rev. 
(2003-04) 
AP 4.4 14,771  0.66  11.0 
Assam   2.1  11,034  3.58  39.0 
Manipur   6.4  11,410  1.46  08.3 
Meghalaya   6.2  15,070  3.23  22.0 
Mizoram   NA  19,696  0.56  07.0 
Nagaland   2.6  18,911  1.30  06.0 
Tripura   7.4  17,459  1.94  18.0 
All India   5.3  17,822  5.3*   
Source: Government of India (2000, 2001b; 2005c).  
Note: *Average for all states, as per cent of GDP.    17
Part of the problem of disparity in wellbeing is the overall poor economic performance 
of the region (Table 5) Though the data shows a variance in overall growth rate of 
economy, per capita wealth creation across provinces in the region has been below the 
national average.  
 
A variety of reasons could account for this poor performance. Though the region has 
rich resources, there have been (barring the case of Assam) little organized efforts to 
exploit them productively. Further markets in the region are not developed; there is also 
the problem of transportation, of availability of power and of poor infrastructure and 
limited investment. There is also poor agricultural surplus. Late integration of the region 
in the national economy; impact on the region’s economy of the partition of the country 
in 1947, and continuing internal disturbances within, are other factors for northeast’s 
‘interrupted development’ (Government of India 1997: 2). Infrastructural gaps and poor 
state finances resulted in central government stepping in, from the late 1970s, to 
subsidize most subnational governments in the region. This created growth in the 
decades of 1980s and 1990s, but as the cases of both Manipur and Mizoram 
demonstrate, this growth was mostly on account of expansion of the public sector, 
mostly the bureaucracy (Lahiri 2002: 10-11; Roy 2004). Of the total number of people 
in gainful employment (in the organized sector) in Manipur in 1991, 98.6 per cent were 
in the public sector. In 2002, there were over 90,000 persons employed by the Manipur 
state government (North Eastern Council 2000). Similarly, the Mizoram government 
employs some 13 per cent of the total work force in the state, perhaps one of the highest 
in the country (Roy 2004). It has been a similar story of bloated bureaucracies across the 
region. Ratio of state government employees to the population in the 1980s was 1:17 in 
Nagaland, 1:20 in Mizoram, and 1:29 in Tripura. The all-India figure was 1:113 
(Verghese 1996: 340). 
 
Reliance on the public sector and dependence on central transfers for its upkeep have 
prevented attention on developing a viable private sector as the engine for growth and 
for creating opportunities. This also meant that most public expenditure has been on 
maintaining the large and largely ineffective public sector leading many to comment, 
‘financial situation of most northeastern states is not sustainable even in the medium 
run’ (Sachdeva 2001: 80). This has had negative implications for development 
investment by state governments. According to an official report, the health sector in 
Manipur has seen consistent decline in fund allocation over the preceding five years. 
(Government of India 2004: para 3.2). Insured transfers from the centre to subsidize 
states’ revenue expenditures have also meant that there is little incentive for local 
leaders to improve public service delivery, increase own revenues and stabilize state 
finances (Table 5). In conjunction with other factors, this has facilitated rent-seeking 
activity and wasteful expenditure.17  
 
                                                 
17 The Pioneer, ‘Manipur: Anarchy Rules’, 6 December 2000.   18
Policy changes at the central government led in the late 1990s to an employment freeze 
in the region’s public sector. Along with high levels of education, this has led to a 
serious unemployment problem, especially amongst educated youth (Table 6) and 
which adds to the sense of frustration that feeds into conflicts. Though unemployment 
rate is lower than in India overall, the northeast’s unemployment assumes special 
significance given its high growth in recent years; 10.74 per cent in Manipur compared 
a national figure of 4.55 per cent, between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (Bhawmik 2002: 
400).  
 
Rising unemployment sets up the issue of conflicts over resources and opportunities that 
fuel so much of northeast’s violence. Inability of the state to provide opportunities for 
educated youth and absence of an effective private sector has worsened these. 
Comparative material from Manipur and Mizoram demonstrate that where state leaders 
have tried to accommodate different sections of society and provided them with a sense 
of equitable access to opportunities; conflicts have been mitigated and serious violence 
avoided. Where leaders have failed on these counts, contestations have multiplied and 
have taken more violent turns. In Manipur skewed representation of communities in 
public employment has been a source of continuing radicalization of tribal youth. While 
reservation policy has fixed tribal representation in public sector in Manipur at 31 per 
cent (compared to their population proportion of 37 per cent) their actual share in public 
sector is much lower: 20.3 per cent in medical, 8.5 per cent in education, 21.80 per cent 
in the state police, and 16 per cent in the civil service (Nengsong 2003). This imbalance 
is exacerbated by skewed allocation of budgetary resources for the province’s tribal 
districts: 26 per cent in education, 25 per cent in health, 22 per cent in public works, 14 
per cent in social welfare, 12 per cent in agriculture. (Government of Manipur 2004).18 
Investment by commercial banks in the province shows a similar imbalance: proportion 
of credit to hill districts as a proportion of credit to the province as a whole was 21.4 per 
cent in 2003 and only 7.8 per cent in 2002 (Union Bank of India various). 




public (‘000) 1997 
Employment: 
private (‘000) 1997 
Unemployment: 
(%) 1999-2000 
Arunachal Pradesh  1.1      0.9 
Assam 26.6  538.9 566.8  4.6 
Manipur   2.2  77.6  1.8  3.5 
Meghalaya   2.3  69.1  7.7  0.9 
Mizoram   0.9  39.6  1.4  2.0 
Nagaland   2.0  69.0  2.7  3.5 
Tripura   3.2  99.6  10.5  1.9    
Source: North Eastern Council (2000). 
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In Mizoram, Autonomous District Councils (ADC) have to some extent, and for the 
time being, insured that allocation of opportunities and resources across communities 
and regions is less skewed. But the opportunity problem of the northeast has grown a 
beyond the point where equitable access could hope to resolve it. There simply is not 
enough opportunity available for the region’s large and rising population of educated 
youth. As rising contestations between groups in Mizoram demonstrate, strains on the 
existing distributive system are clearly evident, with peripheral communities demanding 
greater share of jobs and resources.19 Critical for the reconstruction effort in the region 
will therefore be the ability of state leaders to create additional jobs through growth in 
the private sector.  
 
For reconstruction to be effective in northeast India, it must also encompass the 
following: 
(i)  public expenditure and revenue reforms: better management of state finances, 
including enhancing state revenue and better allocation of resources across 
sectors and groups;  
(ii)  public management reforms: improving the capability of institutions of the state 
to better deliver public services and making them accountable; 
(iii)  creation of greater opportunities through private sector growth.  
 
All this will need to be done inclusively, ensuring equitable access for all sections.20 
Economic reforms at the centre have led the central government pressurizing state 
governments in the region to put in place measures for public expenditure and revenue 
reforms. All state governments are now implementing the Mid Term Financial 
Restructuring Policy (MTFRP). While there is little evidence to show that these 
measures have been backed with a solid commitment to reforms, attempts to grapple 
with other concerns of reconstruction—enhancing better management and oversight of 
public services and more equitable access to resources—have hardly received the 
attention they deserve. Efforts to enhance private sector investment and growth, where 
they have been taken up, have largely ignored the institutional conditions that constrain 
private capital formation in the region.  
 
MTFRP basically entails package of measures to improve the states’ fiscal situation 
through instrument to contain public expenditure and enhance state revenue. The former 
has been implemented by, first freezing employment in the public sector and by 
attempts to restructure and downsize government departments; reforming public sector 
undertakings (PSU), involving winding up of loss making units, privatizing those that 
could attract buyers and in some cases to revival of existing units. (Sachdeva 2001: 79-
80; Das 2001: 62). While these measures together may have helped to contain the 
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20 These interventions are informed by works on reconstruction in Africa (Addison, 2001a, 2001b, 2003).    20
growth in public expenditure, reducing expenditure has mostly been a pipe dream.21 
The situation has been worsened by the implementation of revised pay scales for central 
government employees that were adopted in whole by state governments in the region, 
and which significantly pushed up salary expenditures of state governments (Das 2001: 
62-3).  
 
Revenue enhancement measures have included attempts to introduce new taxes, widen 
the tax net to cover more taxpayers, improve revenue governance and introduce 
measures to increase non-tax revenues. But the revenue generating ability of the state in 
the region has always been questionable. All seven provinces in northeast India are 
‘special category states’ whose development plans are almost entirely centrally financed 
on the basis of 90 per cent grant and 10 per cent loan. Central assistance for state plan 
outlays has been historically as high as 111 per cent for those in the region, as opposed 
to 37 per cent for India as a whole (Verghese 1996: 38). Result has been that regional 
economies are heavily dependent on the rest of the country for their basic needs. 
Barring Assam, all provinces have shown a poor propensity to raise revenue (Table 5). 
 
While quality of revenue governance including poor performance of tax collection 
machinery and a poor tax structure contribute to poor revenue extraction in the region,22 
there are other institutional factors that undermine revenue capacity of the smaller 
provinces. Most economic activity in the region remains in the informal sector, outside 
of state control and regulation and taxation. This sector provides the bulk of the 
economic activity in the hill areas, from forest produce to the large cross-border trade in 
consumer goods as well as narcotics from and to Myanmar (and Nepal) (Verghese 
1996: 121-3; Harriss 2003: 2). Further, the entire tribal population in the region stands 
outside the state tax net, there being no tax on personal income for tribes.23 And land in 
tribal areas being a community asset does not incur state tax either; the only form of 
taxation, in Manipur for instance, being the token hill house tax. Despite 
recommendations to bring economic activity in the hills within the formal system and to 
introduce some form of income tax, little has happened24 (Government of India 1997: 
27). Together, these factors have derailed attempts to reform the fiscal system.  
 
                                                 
21 Commitment of the political leadership being major problem. In Manipur for example, there have been 
instances where decisions to merge or abolish government departments were reversed (Lahiri 2002: 3).  
22 An example being: of the 903 lawyers registered in Manipur, only 3 had paid mandatory professional 
tax in 2000-01 (Lahiri 2002: 23).  
23 Tribes make up 28 per cent of the population of the region; excluding Assam, their share in population 
in the region is 65 per cent (Registrar General of India 2001). 
24 This is even as non-state actors, particularly rebel groups have managed to establish sophisticated tax 
extraction networks that target the large informal economy; tribals and non-tribals alike, as well as the 
region’s bloated bureaucracies, to their advantage; The Hindustan Times, ‘Insurgency and Misgovernance 
Deterring Development’, 19 June 2001.   21
Both the central government and state governments in the region recognize that private 
capital is the critical component for the northeast’s economic progress. To be able to 
facilitate this the Shukla Commission, looking into backlogs in basic services and gaps 
in infrastructure development, recommended investment in the region of over U$11.75 
billion over time, mostly in power, roads, railways, flood control, irrigation and inland 
water transport) Government of India (1997: 8-9). These recommendations formed the 
basis of the ‘package for the northeast’ worth some US$2.23 billion announced by the 
central government in 1997 and which have led to significant increase in capital inflows 
into the region (see Ahmad 2000). Attempts are also being made to create an investor-
friendly environment through a variety of incentives and tax breaks, by central 
ministries as well as by individual state governments (e.g. North East India Industrial 
Policy, 1997). Central agencies have also attempted to get state leaders to promote their 
provinces as investment destinations, also for foreign capital.25 Of late, the centre has 
taken much interest in promoting its Look East Policy, with the objective to promote 
northeast region as the gateway to India’s trade and cultural links with South East 
Asia.26 Private business has been closely associated in these promotional efforts and 
observers have noted the changed mood for investment in the region among business as 
demonstrated by the increasing activity of business associations. Though investment has 
begun to pick up in Assam it is still very limited in the rest of the region (Sachdeva 
2001: 81). 
 
Private sector investment requires—besides tax breaks, transport subsidies and road 
shows—an institutional environment that facilitates capital formation. Critical here is 
security of life and property, and a legitimate legal framework. Also required is an 
institutional environment that allows free movement of factors of production and 
absence of entry barriers. Little of this exists in the region with its high levels of 
violence, myriad and conflicting legal and bureaucratic regulations, significant barriers 
to entry and movement in some provinces and, in much of the region, an effective 
absence of market for land, with little private rights in land, let alone security of 
property right.27 Studies on the region have long underlined the need for changes in 
property rights (Government of India 1981: 40). Others have pointed to the need of an 
effective labour policy (Sachdeva 2001: 82). Without these necessary, though 
admittedly difficult changes, hopes of private investment and growth will remain 
unfulfilled. Moreover, half-hearted attempts at instilling fiscal discipline and attracting 
private capital without concomitant steps to ensure rule of law and accountability 
                                                 
25 The annual northeast India Business Summits and northeast India Agri Business meetings are good 
examples. 
26 The Telegraph, ‘Northeast Echoes’, Calcutta, 13 December 2005. 
27 Some of these are the Inner Line Regulation (ILR), restricting ‘outsiders’, foreigners as well as Indian 
nationals from outside the region, entry into tribal areas; regulations that prevent non-tribes buying land 
or doing business in tribal areas; numerous customary codes and practices existing in place of the formal 
law codes. The state also has little authority in some of these areas to enforce laws, agreements and 
contracts.    22
mechanisms in public institutions have led to pervasive corruption in public life, 
resulting in loss of legitimacy of the state. It is only by enhancing its legitimate strength 
—through better management of its economy; by bringing most economic activity 
within its control; by enabling services and opportunities for gainful employment for all 
sections of society; and finally by improved and accountable working of its 
institutions—that national leaders can hope to regain the state’s lost legitimacy and spur 
growth. 
5 Conclusion   
Admittedly, the ‘development’ challenge before societies in northeast India, as in the 
rest of India, is huge. Issues around resources, capabilities and political commitment to 
undertake reforms constrain their resolution. These are important issues that cannot be 
just wished away in situations of late development. Where societies are in the thick of 
protracted conflicts and violence, the path to development and to reconstruction is 
further muddied. And yet some societies, particularly those that are cohesive, seem to 
have done better than others in pulling out of these crises (see Migdal 1988; Fukuyama 
2004). Comparative material from northeast India supports this finding: a cohesive 
Mizo society has managed to restore peace and follow it up with some tentative steps 
towards growth versus a fragmented society in Manipur, where groups seem to be 
perpetually locked in contestations and violence, leading to policy paralysis among state 
leaders. A central reconstruction concern then is: how can divided societies be made 
cohesive? 
 
A way forward is use of politics, particularly the role of political organization and 
policies and practices of political leaders, to bring about cohesiveness. Cohesiveness 
can be constructed, where politics is organized inclusively; i.e. where political parties 
have inclusive make-up and where they use citizenship or other state-wide criteria to 
mobilize people; and where political elites establish coalitions across groups. Much of 
the cohesiveness that one notices in Mizoram is itself the outcome of these inclusive 
organization and policies—investing in and promoting centralized and inclusive 
political parties such as Mizo Union and Mizo National Front; mobilizing people around 
an inclusive Mizo identity; undertaking legal and administrative reforms enabling all 
sections access to power and resources; and finally building political coalitions across 
groups. Of course, the Mizo record of cohesiveness is by no means unblemished. Rising 
socioeconomic challenges have begun to strain relationships amongst groups in 
Mizoram, and contestations are on the rise. Given this, the big challenge before Mizo 
leaders is how to build on and reinforce inclusive tendencies of their past leaders, steer 
clear of exclusivity, spur economic growth, and create enough opportunities that all 
sections are able to get their fair share.   
 
Before we conclude, two issues need to be flagged that could form the basis of a future 
research agenda. Given the multinational character of the Indian state, an important   23
issue that policymakers must contend with is: how to determine the right mix of policies 
to strengthen the state in relationship to society? ‘Strength’ meaning the ability of the 
state to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently thereby 
exercising its legitimacy. The Indian response to multiculturalism has been in the form 
of recognizing cultural differences and the rights of cultural (and religious and 
linguistic) communities to protect and promote their distinct ways of life. For religious 
communities this space has meant freedom of religion; right to establish own 
institutions; and recognition of personal laws of communities. For linguistic minorities 
it has entailed creation of language-based administrative units with political rights to 
govern themselves within the national federal system. For tribal communities in the 
northeast region, exclusive territorial units have been created within which tribes have 
been given the freedom to govern themselves according to their distinct customary 
practices. Additional concessions, meant to help integrate tribes into the ‘Indian 
mainstream’ provide for their reservation in elected bodies and in public employment. 
Commentators have cited these as important factors for the stability of Indian 
democracy. What has been the cost to the capability of the state, of these cultural and 
economic policies, designed to accommodate multiculturalism? As we saw in the case 
of northeast India, persistence of multiple and conflicting rule systems in tribal areas has 
compromised the authority and strength of the state and may be feeding into the crises 
in the region—though admittedly the crisis goes beyond tribal areas. Other concessions 
designed to promote the interests of specific communities impact on the ability of the 
state to stimulate nationwide growth. 
 
An associated issue is that of the relationship between cultural rights of communities 
and basic rights of individuals as citizens. Often it has been seen that even though the 
individual has ample rights as member of a cultural community, their rights as citizen 
are less well served. As we saw in our preceding discussion, a member of a particular 
tribal community may enjoy latitude in their cultural practices and customary codes 
(latitude that may have helped more the elites than the masses) individuals face 
significant disempowerment in terms of public goods that the state is duty bound to 
provide them as citizens of the country—access to education, healthcare, opportunities, 
and to security of life. Of course this dichotomy is not unique to the northeast. 
Protection of cultural diversity of peripheral communities in the country exists, 
increasingly now, along with their marginalization and discrimination within the polity. 
Indeed provision of community rights could also be seen as providing a rationale for 
denial of basic rights to citizens? What does this mean for the future of democracy and 
stability in India? As a commentator has warned, ‘if the multicultural fabric of Indian 
federal democracy is to sustain itself then affirmation of special rights needs to go hand-
in-hand with affirmation of the basic rights of individuals as citizens of the polity’ 
(Mahajan 2005: 311). It is important therefore to ask what is important for the state and 
the citizen: cultural rights and recognition of diversity for the community or rights of the 
individual as citizen, irrespective of cultural association. And if both are important, then 
what is the right mix?   24
Annexe 
Armed insurgencies in northeast India: timeline 
1947  Naga National Council’s (NNC) declares Independent Nagaland  
1947  India’s Independence  
1949  ‘Princely states’ of Manipur and Tripura, integrated into the Indian union, and brought under 
direct central rule  
1955  Eruption of armed violence between NNC cadres and government forces in Naga districts of 
Assam 
1958  Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) promulgated in Nagaland  
1962  Government of India signs 16-Point Agreement with moderate Nagas NNC keeps out 
1963  State of Nagaland created, carved out of Assam  
1964  NNC signs ceasefire deal with the centre. Peace Mission established by government to mobilise 
support for a peaceful settlement to the Naga issue  
United National Liberation Front (UNLF) established in Manipur to restore pre-integration 
status; UNLF’s methods became violent in 1990s when it set up Manipur Peoples’ army (MPA) 
1966  Violence erupts in Mizo district of Assam with Mizo National Front’s (MNF) declaration of 
independent Mizoram 
1972  MNF negotiates a ceasefire with the Government. Mizo district carved out of Assam and made 
into a union territory with its own legislature but under direct central administration; centrally 
administered territories of Manipur and Tripura made full states  
1975  Shillong (peace) Accord signed between central government and NNC in Nagaland  
1977  Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) formed in Manipur to expel outsiders 
from the state  
1978  People’s Liberation army (PLA) formed in Manipur to establish a free Manipur  
1979  Anti-foreigners movement launched in Assam led by Asom Gana Parishad (AGP); same year 
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) formed to liberate Assam through armed struggle 
1980  Key leaders of NNC break away from the party over the issue of Shillong Accord and form the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) to continue their armed movement against the 
government  
1986  Central government signs the Mizo Peace Accord with MNF, ending the violence in the state 
1987  Mizoram gains full statehood. MNF chief Laldenga elected chief Minister of the state 
1988  NSCN splits over leadership issues, into NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang) factions, 
each supporting different tribal groups within the Naga community 
1989  National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) set up in Tripura with the objective to set up a 
sovereign tribal Tripura 
1990  All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) established in Tripura to restore Tripura’s tribal character and 
drive away outsider settlers 
1991  Ethnic violence between Nagas and Kukis sparks off in Manipur and Nagaland, led mostly by 
insurgent groups on either side 
1992  Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) formed in 1992 by Khasis and Jaintias in 
Meghalaya to oust outsiders from the state and gain freedom  
1995  Achik National Volunteer Council formed in Meghalaya to fight for a Garo homeland in 
Meghalaya 
1997  Onset of ethnic clashes between Kuki and Paite tribes in Manipur 
1997  NSCN (Isak-Muivah) signs ceasefire agreement with central government   25
2001  NSCN (Khaplang) signs ceasefire agreement with central government 
2001  Outbreak of protracted mass agitation and ethnic violence in Manipur between Meteis and 
Nagas, sparked off by centre extending its ceasefire agreement with NSCN (Isak-Muivah) to 
Manipur (and other neighbouring areas); Naga peace process complicated by NSCN demanding 
bringing together Naga areas of Manipur with Nagaland (into a Greater Nagalim) and Meteis 
opposing the call 
2005  Attempts by the centre and civil society in Assam, to initiate peace dialogue with ULFA 
2006  (31.1–5.2) 10th round of peace talks between central government and NSCN (Isak-Muivah) 
Compiled by author from Institute for Conflict Management (Timeline) online edition www.satp.org 
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